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MAY THE PRESIDENT APPROPRIATELY INVOKE GOD?  EVALUATING THE 
EMBRYONIC STEM CELL VETOES  





President George W. Bush twice vetoed measures to provide federal funds for 
embryonic stem cell research requiring the destruction of human embryos.  Each 
veto was premised in part upon his religious beliefs.  President Bush’s reliance 
upon his faith provoked a strong negative reaction.  This essay argues that this 
criticism is baseless.   
 
The essay demonstrates that important political leaders spanning three centuries—
including Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and Martin Luther King Jr.—have 
invoked religious beliefs in explaining their positions.  The principle of 
“separation of church and state,” properly understood, is not a persuasive basis for 
criticizing this religious heritage.  President Bush, in relying upon his faith to 
justify his vetoes, acted in accord with well-established national tradition.  
 
The essay also examines various arguments that religious discourse in the public 
square is normatively inappropriate and thus should be excluded.  All of these 
critiques fail.   Anyone genuinely committed to diversity and to democratic ideals 
should support a rich array of disputants in public policy controversies, including 
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INTRODUCTION 
President George W. Bush’s first prime-time television address, on August 9, 
2001, was devoted to embryonic stem cell research.  After describing his struggle 
with the issue, he revealed that his position was “shaped by deeply held beliefs,” 
including the belief that “human life is a sacred gift from our Creator.”
1
  He then 
announced the very first federal funding of stem cell research, although he limited 
it to stem cells obtained from embryos that had already been destroyed.
2
  Bush 
believed that using taxpayer funding to encourage further destruction of human 
embryos would cross “a fundamental moral line.”
3
  In July 2006, Bush vetoed a 
bill that “would have allowed taxpayer-financed research on [stem cell] lines 
derived from embryos slated for destruction by fertility clinics.”
4
  Bush said that 
the bill, by supporting “the taking of innocent human life in the hope” of 
benefiting others, crossed “a moral boundary that our decent society needs to 
respect.”
5
  To cross that line would violate “[o]ur conscience and history” as a 
nation “founded on the principle that we are all created equal, and endowed by 
our Creator with the right to life.”
6
  In June 2007, President Bush vetoed another 
embryonic stem cell research bill that contemplated the deliberate destruction of 
human embryos.
7
  The President, while not explicitly mentioning a “Creator,” 
once more stressed that America is “a nation founded on the principle that all 
human life is sacred.”
8
 
                                                 
1
 George W. Bush, President, President Discusses Stem Cell Research, (Aug. 9, 2001) (transcript 






 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, First Bush Veto Maintains Limits On Stem Cell Use, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 
2006, at A1.   
5
 George W. Bush, President, President Discusses Stem Cell Research Policy (July 19, 2006) 
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/print/20060719-3.html). 
6
 Id.  President Bush’s formal veto message contains no reference to religious faith.  It refers only 
to “ethics” and the “ideals of a decent and humane society.”  George W. Bush, President, Message 
to the House of Representatives (Jul. 19, 2006) (transcript available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/print/20060719-5.html). 
7
 George W. Bush, President, President Bush Discusses Stem Cell Veto and Executive Order, 
(June 20, 2007) (transcript available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/06/print/20070620-8.html).   
8
 Id.  President Bush’s formal veto message again does not mention religion, but does refer to the 
“sanctity of human life.”  George W. Bush, President, Message to the Senate of the United States 
(June 20, 2007) (transcript available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/06/print/20070620-5.html).   
 4 
 
President Bush has been roundly criticized for the religious foundation of his 
position.  Ron Reagan Jr., in his 2004 speech at the Democratic National 
Convention, did not refer to Bush by name, but clearly had him in mind in saying 
“that the theology of a few should not be allowed to forestall the health and well-
being of the many.”
9
  Criticism exploded over the 2006 Bush veto.  Jonathan 
Turley in USA Today faulted Bush’s “faith-based politics” for what he called its 
“holy-dot theory”—a reference to the fact that early embryos killed in research 
are about the size of the dot over the letter “i.”
10
  Frank Rich in the New York 
Times was vehement.  Bush had canonized “clumps of frozen cells.”
11
  Rich 
hoped “the White House embrace of stem cell fanaticism” would be “a turning 
point in America’s own religious wars.”
12
  It might lead to election losses for 
what he called America’s own “ayatollahs.”
13
  Bush’s 2007 veto produced similar 
criticism.  Bush insisted “on imposing fundamentalist religious views on 
everyone.”
14
  “By means of bald assertion, the White House seeks to enshrine in 





This essay argues that President Bush acted appropriately in relying upon his 
religious beliefs to explain his position on embryonic stem cell research.
16
  
                                                 
9
 Ron Reagan, Jr., Speech at Democratic National Convention (July 27, 2004) (transcript available 
at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/vote2004/demconvention/speeches/reagan.htm).  Reagan 
acknowledges that religious people are entitled to believe, as “an article of faith,” that destroying 
an embryo “is tantamount to murder,” but disapproves their acting on this belief. Id.   
10
 Jonathan Turley, The Case For Macroscopic Humans, USA TODAY, July 18, 2006, at 13A.  
This article was published a few days before the actual veto. 
11




 Id.  While Rich emphasizes the stem cell veto, he also mentions other issues in his 
condemnation of Bush’s faith-informed politics.  See id.  Rich obviously is upset by virtually any 
integration of faith and politics, even if this reaction belies his purported commitment to diversity.  
See infra text accompanying note 168.   
14
 Edd Doerr, Letter to the Editor, Vetoing Stem Cells, Vetoing Life, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2007, at 
A20. 
15
 Editorial, States Must Lead, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 25, 2007, at A08. 
16
 One doubts that President Bush’s critics would have been mollified had he not explicitly 
referred to his faith.  At the very least, he should be commended for being honest about the 
presuppositions underlying his actions.  See E.J. Dionne, Jr., Idea of Public Reason: Not a 
 5 
Religious believers of all faiths—including the President—are entitled to 
participate in public debate and be explicit about their faith in doing so.  Part I 
demonstrates that Bush acted in accord with a long-established practice in 
American political life—a tradition embodied in the words and actions of the 
Founders and of subsequent great leaders.  Part II shows that there are no 
persuasive normative arguments for barring from the public square arguments that 
are both faith-based and expressed in religious terminology.  Part III argues that 
there is nothing special about a presidential veto to justify the criticism President 
Bush received. 
 
To avoid being misunderstood, it is important to state what this essay does not do.  
First, it does not address the merits of the stem cell controversy.
17
  Second, it does 
not argue that any particular religious perspective—specifically, Christianity
18
—is 
of right entitled to pre-eminence in American political life.  Third, it does not 
suggest that Christians all agree with President Bush on the stem cell issue or that 
there necessarily is an exclusive Christian position on any other public policy 
issue.  Fourth, it does not contend that Christians should try to implement all their 
moral views through law.
19
  Fifth, it does not assert that Christians should always 
                                                                                                                                     
Warrant for Ceasing in the Effort to Live the Truth as We Are Able, 1 J.L. PHIL. & CULTURE 69, 
72 (2007).  Such transparency is often a missing trait among politicians.      
17
 The embryonic stem cell controversy could perhaps diminish due to the recent announcement of 
new technology “showing that pluripotent stem cells—cells with the exact properties of 
embryonic stem cells—can be produced by reprogramming ordinary skin cells obtained 
harmlessly from donors.”  See Robert P. George, Law and Moral Purpose, FIRST THINGS: A 
MONTHLY JOURNAL OF RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, Jan. 2008, at 22, 24.  This development, while 
very significant, see Maureen L. Condic, Getting Stem Cells Right, FIRST THINGS, Feb. 2008, 
passim, is beyond the scope of this essay.   
18
 This essay focuses on Christianity because that is the author’s faith.  The arguments made, 
however, apply to all faiths.  Religious believers of all faiths are entitled fully to participate in 
public life, and they are equally entitled to be open about their faith in doing so.  An exception to 
this proposition involves insincere professions of faith.  It would be inappropriate to pretend that 
one’s position is faith-based solely for anticipated political advantage.  Doing so would be to 
deceive the public.  For how this limitation applies to Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and 
John F. Kennedy, see, respectively, infra notes 38, 70, 78.                   
19
 (Non-religious people presumably do not have this goal either.)  What laws to seek involves a 
careful consideration of the faith’s internal principles of self-restraint, see Samuel W. Calhoun, 
Grounding Normative Assertions: Arthur Leff’s Still Irrefutable, But Incomplete, “Sez Who?” 
Critique, 20 J. L. & RELIGION. 31, 62 n.224 and accompanying text (2004-05), and also the 
exercise of prudent political judgment. 
 6 
use explicitly religious language to articulate their faith-based moral views.
20
  
Sixth, it does not posit that Christians, or those of any faith, should expect their 
religious arguments to convince, on religious grounds, even their fellow believers, 




I. AMERICAN HISTORY SHOWS THAT PRESIDENT BUSH ACTED 
APPROPRIATELY 
 
(A) GOD—AND THE NATION’S THEISTIC FOUNDATION—UNDER ATTACK 
To the casual observer, it is not a good time to be God.  The Almighty has 
received some rough handling of late.  Witness the success of three recent books, 
Richard Dawkins’s The God Delusion,
22
 Sam Harris’s The End of Faith,
23
 and 
Christopher Hitchens’ god Is Not Great.
24
  The authors collectively express alarm 
and disdain for the annoying persistence of a belief in a supernatural deity.
25
  
They wage a rhetorical war of extermination against God.
26
  
                                                 
20
 When to do so is a matter of what the faith requires in particular situations, see id. at 62 n.225 
and accompanying text, and also a matter of prudent political judgment, i.e., the perceived impact 
of an open appeal to religious faith.  
21
 In fact, they should expect that their religious arguments will sometimes be viewed as irrelevant 
or even provoke a strong negative reaction. 
22
 RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION (2006). 
23
 SAM HARRIS, THE END OF FAITH: RELIGION, TERROR, AND THE FUTURE OF REASON (2004).  See 
also SAM HARRIS, LETTER TO A CHRISTIAN NATION (2006).    
24
 CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT: HOW RELIGION POISONS EVERYTHING (2007).  
Dawkins, Harris, and Hitchens are three proponents of what Peter Berkowitz calls the “new new 
atheism,” which differs from “the Enlightenment atheism of the 18th century . . . [by] 
proclaim[ing] its hatred of God and organized religion loudly and proudly from the rooftops.”  
Peter Berkowitz, The New New Atheism, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2007, at A13.  John Micklethwait 
says that the three men’s books have “torn into religion.”  John Micklethwait, In God’s Name, THE 
ECONOMIST, Nov. 1, 2007, at 4.  For the publishing success of the authors’ books (and other 
similar books), see Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, Hitchens Book Debunking The Deity Is Surprise Hit, 
WALL ST. J., June 22, 2007, at B1; and Anthony Gottlieb, Atheists With Attitude, THE NEW 
YORKER, May 21, 2007, at 77.  For severe criticism of the New Atheists by a self-proclaimed 
atheist, see Theodore Dalrymple, What the New Atheists Don’t See, THE CITY JOURNAL, Autumn 
2007, at 118. 
25
 According to Berkowitz, “the new new atheism . . . lament[s] . . . the perverse and widespread 
resistance to shedding once and for all the hopelessly backward belief in a divine presence in 
history.”  Berkowitz, supra note 24. 
26
 Since this essay is not a full review of the books by Dawkins, Harris, and Hitchens, it does not 
respond in detail to their various attacks upon the concept of a supernatural God.  Their arguments, 
however, are hardly new.  Some, such as the presence of evil in the world, have an ancient lineage.  
See HITCHENS, supra note 24, at 267-68 (citing Epicurus).  Recent recapitulations of this and other 
standard objections to a theistic God can be found in the works of Harvard’s Steven Pinker and 
Edward Wilson.  See STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN 
NATURE (2002); HOW THE MIND WORKS (1997); EDWARD O. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY 
 7 
 
The extremism of the authors’ assault is readily demonstrated by a modest 
exercise involving the Declaration of Independence.  The Declaration refers to a 
supreme being four times, most famously in the second paragraph: “We hold 
these Truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are 
Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.”
27
  This passage makes sense only in 
reference to a God who was believed to exist and to interact with mankind.
28
  The 
same is true for the Declaration’s other references to God.  The opening paragraph 
cites “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God” as entitling our “one People . . . to 
assume among the Powers of the earth . . . [a] “separate and equal station.”
29
  The 
closing paragraph appeals “to the Supreme Judge of the World for the rectitude of 
the [signatories’] intentions,” and, in pledging their “Lives . . . Fortunes, and . . . 
sacred Honor” to support the Declaration, expresses their “firm Reliance on the 




Dawkins, Harris, and Hitchens’ ideas would radically change the Declaration.  To 
see how, one has only to substitute their opinions of God for the original 
                                                                                                                                     
OF KNOWLEDGE (1998); ON HUMAN NATURE (1978).  Pinker and Wilson are unpersuasive in 
proving God’s non-existence.  For a comprehensive attempt to refute them, see Calhoun, supra 
note 19, at 70-85.               
27
 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  Jefferson’s original draft did not 
contain the phrase, “endowed by their Creator.”  He instead referred to men’s deriving “from their 
equal creation ‘rights inherent & inalienable.’”  PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING 
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 134 (1997).  But after being “carefully worked over” by the 
drafting Committee of Five (Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Roger Sherman, 
and Robert R. Livingston; id. at 43), the document was reported to Congress with this now 
familiar phrase.  Id. at 135.  Although “endowed by their Creator” more explicitly attributes to 
God the inherent rights of man, Jefferson’s original phrase, “from their equal creation,” is no 
different in substance.  Jefferson indisputably believed that God was both mankind’s creator and 
the giver of rights, see infra note 43; see also infra text accompanying note 53, a fact corroborated 
by his acquiescence in the drafting Committee’s alteration.       
28
 For the faith-based perspective with which Abraham Lincoln viewed this passage, see infra note 
72 and accompanying text.  
29
 THE DECLARATION, supra note 27, at para. 1.  To Jefferson, the “Laws of Nature” did not exist 
independently of “Nature’s God.”  Rather, “[t]hey came into being by God’s decree.”  EDWIN S. 
GAUSTAD, SWORN ON THE ALTAR OF GOD: A RELIGIOUS BIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 36 
(1996).  See MAIER, supra note 27, at 132-33. 
30
 THE DECLARATION, supra note 27, at para. 32.  See infra note 36 for a discussion of Congress’s, 
not Jefferson’s, authorship of these two references to God. 
 8 
language.  A “pernicious delusion,”
31
 not our “Creator,” made all men equal and 
gave them “unalienable Rights.”
32
  An “ancient man-made deit[y,]”
33
 not 
“Nature’s God,” is now the source of “the Laws of Nature.”  The signatories no 
longer appeal to the “Supreme Judge of the World,” but to “the offal of the 
ancient world.”
34
  And the signatories, instead of relying upon “divine 
Providence,” now invoke “our prehistory . . . [failing to] escape the gnarled hands 
which reach out to drag us back to the catacombs and the reeking altars and the 




It is thus clear that Dawkins, Harris, and Hitchens not only repudiate, but also 
mock, a core concept of the American founding—belief in God.
36
  Richard 
Dawkins not only disparages the Founders’ theism, but also goes to startling 
lengths to obfuscate it.  Dawkins speculates that John Adams and Thomas 
Jefferson might actually have been atheists or agnostics.  In view of Adams’s 
“devout Christian[ity]”
37
 and Jefferson’s authorship of the second paragraph of 
                                                 
31
 DAWKINS, supra note 22, at 31.  Hitchens says that our “maker” is not a “‘who’” at all, but 
instead “a process of mutation.”  HITCHENS, supra note 24, at 9.   
32
 The assertion here is not that Dawkins, Harris, and Hitchens reject human equality or the 
concept of inherent rights.  Rather, the point is that the three emphatically repudiate God as the 
source.  Although the authors do not recognize it, their repudiation of a supernatural deity exposes 
them to a major epistemological challenge—endowment by God is the only possible 
substantiation for universal human rights.  See infra notes 118-123 and accompanying text.      
33
 HITCHENS, supra note 24, at 7.  This man-made God is of necessity “imaginary.”  See HARRIS, 
LETTER, supra note 23, at 91.   
34
 HARRIS, THE END OF FAITH, supra note 23, at 47; see id. at 25 (“dark and barbarous past”), see 
also id. at 224 (“blood-soaked heirlooms of a previous age”).   
35
 HITCHENS, supra note 24, at 283. 
36
 Pauline Maier, in explaining why Congress added to Jefferson’s draft of the Declaration the two 
references to God in its final paragraph, states: “Americans held strong religious beliefs in 1776, 
and the Declaration was meant to state the convictions of the country’s ‘good people.’”  MAIER, 
supra note 27, at 149.  The completed Declaration, resulting from Congress’s alterations to 
Jefferson’s draft, was “a public document, an authenticated expression of the American mind.”  Id.  
Jefferson later referred to the Declaration as “‘the genuine effusion of the soul of our country at 
that time.’”  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. James Mease (Sept. 26, 1825), in THE LIFE AND 
SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 722 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 
1944).   
37
 DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 19 (2001).  This is McCullough’s assessment of Adams in 
1776.  Id. at 20.  Later in his life, Adams was not an orthodox Christian.  See JAMES GRANT, JOHN 
ADAMS: PARTY OF ONE 442 (2005).  Since, however, Adams never lost his faith in God, id.; 
MCCULLOUGH, supra at 650, his non-conformity does nothing to make him useful to Dawkins.  




 this is a surprising undertaking.  But Dawkins purports to have 
evidence.  To demonstrate Adams’s possible atheism, he quotes a single sentence 
from one of Adams’s letters to Jefferson: “‘This would be the best of all possible 
worlds, if there were no religion in it.’”
39
  Are Adams’s words compatible with 
atheism?  Let Adams speak for himself, in the sentences surrounding the quoted 
phrase:  
Twenty times, in the course of my late Reading, have I been upon the 
point of breaking out, “This would be the best of all possible Worlds, if 
there were no Religion in it.” ! ! ! But in this exclamati[on] I should have 
been as fanatical as [here Adams names two men: a former pastor and a 
former teacher].  Without Religion this World would be Something not 




The full quotation clearly shows that Dawkins completely mischaracterizes 
Adams’s views.  Regrettably, Dawkins also misleads his readers with respect to 
Jefferson.     
 
To show Jefferson’s agnosticism, Dawkins quotes him as follows: “‘To talk of 
immaterial existences is to talk of nothings.  To say that the human soul, angels, 
                                                 
38
 Jefferson also was the source of the phrase, “Nature’s God,” in the Declaration’s first paragraph, 
supra note 29 and accompanying text, but he did not author the two references to God in the final 
paragraph.   MAIER, supra note 27, at 148-49; supra note 36.  Concerning Jefferson’s religious 
beliefs, this essay need not concern itself with the long-standing dispute about whether he was an 
orthodox Christian.  See, e.g., GAUSTAD, supra note 29, at 91-92.  The “new new atheists” deride 
all beliefs in a theistic God, whatever their form.  Dawkins, for example, stresses that he is “not 
attacking any particular version of God or gods.  I am attacking God, all gods, anything and 
everything supernatural, wherever and whenever they have been or will be invented.”  DAWKINS, 
supra note 22, at 36.  See HARRIS, LETTER, supra note 23, at 7 (he dismisses “all religions”).  
Since the evidence is overwhelming that Jefferson believed in a theistic God, see supra notes 27, 
29; infra notes 43; 59; 65 and accompanying text, the “new new atheists,” if only they could view 
Jefferson accurately, would be compelled to make him a target of their ridicule.  Moreover, since 
Jefferson’s belief in God was genuine, he satisfies the qualification for invoking God that this 
essay imposes.  See supra note 18.         
39
 DAWKINS, supra note 22, at 43.  In this instance and frequently throughout his book, Dawkins 
provides no citations for quoted language.  Here, Dawkins does not even reveal that Adams’s 
language appeared in a letter to Jefferson.  This obviously makes it very difficult for readers to 
discover its context.   
40
 Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 19, 1817), in THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON 
LETTERS: THE COMPLETE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND ABIGAIL AND 
JOHN ADAMS 508, 509 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1988).     
 10 
god, are immaterial, is to say they are nothings, or that there is no god, no angels, 
no soul . . . I am satisfied . . . with the things which are, without tormenting or 
troubling myself about those which may indeed be, but of which I have no 
evidence.’”
41
  Astoundingly, Dawkins again omits language needed to convey 
Jefferson’s actual position.  Jefferson did believe that immaterialism would mean 
“‘no god,’” but the full quotation shows that he repudiated immaterialism.  He 
instead affirms a belief in a “‘Creator’”/“‘God’” who has a material substance, 
and wonders when the “heresy of immaterialism, this masked atheism,” crept into 
the Christian church.
42
  One with such beliefs obviously cannot accurately be 
labeled an agnostic.
43
      
 
How can Dawkins’s spectacular misuse of the facts be explained?  Deliberate 
deception presumably is not the answer.  Based on Dawkins’s scholarly 
accomplishments, one can also eliminate weak analytical skill.  Inexcusable 
sloppiness might be the cause, if, for example, Dawkins relied on a careless 
research assistant.  Another possible explanation is an ideological bias so 
powerful that Dawkins simply cannot fairly and objectively evaluate the evidence 
before him.  Dawkins’s outrageous mistake thus might identify him as a prime 
example of what Peter Berkowitz says is also true of Christopher Hitchens: “[He] 
shows no awareness that his atheism, far from resulting from skeptical inquiry, is 
                                                 
41
 DAWKINS, supra note 22, at 42.  Dawkins once again fails to identify the quote or to provide a 
citation. 
42
 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Aug. 15, 1820), in THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON 
LETTERS, supra note 40, at 565, 568.   
43
 According to Issac Kramnick and R. Laurence Moore:  
Jefferson was not . . . a godless man.  He attended church services in 
Washington and Charlottesville and contributed money frequently to 
Episcopal, Presbyterian, and Baptist churches.  He talked and wrote about 
his personal religious beliefs and was far from being the impious atheist and 
infidel depicted by his detractors.  He believed fervently in the one God who 
created all men equal.   
Issac Kramnick & R. Laurence Moore, The Baptists, the Bureau, and the Case of the Missing 
Lines, 56 WM. & MARY Q. 817, 817 (1999).  See supra notes 27, 29; infra notes 59, 65 and 
accompanying text. 
 11 
the rigidly dogmatic premise from which his inquiries proceed, and that it colors 
all his observations and determines his conclusions.”
44
   
 
(B) MISCHARACTERIZING “SEPARATION”  
The Founders routinely mixed religion and politics.
45
  Any notion of separating 
the two would have been incomprehensible.
46
  Hitchens, Dawkins, and Harris, 
however, totally mischaracterize the Founders’ concept of the proper relationship 
between religion and public life.  The common drum they beat is “separation of 
church and state.”  This is a useful concept, properly understood,
47
 but the three 
authors distort the phrase’s intended meaning.  Hitchens says that the Founders 
                                                 
44
 Berkowitz, supra note 24.  Dawkins’s disregard of the evidence is a prime example supporting 
Berkowitz’s statement, concerning the “new new atheists” generally, that “[t]he disproportion 
between the bluster and bravado of their rhetoric and the limitations of their major arguments is 
astonishing.”  See id.  Dawkins’s factual distortions are also richly ironic since he derides 
Christianity for (according to his own misinterpretation) treating reason as the enemy of faith.  
DAWKINS, supra note 22, at 190.  See HARRIS, END OF FAITH, supra note 23, at 23-25, 223 
(criticizes religious belief for its disregard of evidence and general irrationality).      
45
 See, e.g., MICHAEL NOVAK, ON TWO WINGS: HUMBLE FAITH AND COMMON SENSE AT THE 
AMERICAN FOUNDING (2002); MICHAEL NOVAK & JANA NOVAK, WASHINGTON’S GOD: RELIGION, 
LIBERTY, AND THE FATHER OF OUR COUNTRY (2006). 
46
 In a recent essay, historian Mark Noll cautions against too much emphasis on the Founding Era 
in current debates over the proper role of religion in public life.  Mark Noll, America’s Two 
Foundings, FIRST THINGS: A MONTHLY JOURNAL OF RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, Dec. 2007, at 29, 
34.  His rationale is that in the ensuing years America has experienced second foundings in both 
religion and politics.  Id. at 29, 31.  Noll argues that understanding the changes wrought by these 
developments is essential for astute evaluation of modern problems.  See id.  Noll’s insights about 
societal change are valuable, but do not diminish the importance of accurately understanding how 
the Founders viewed the concept of separation.  Many, including the Supreme Court, continue to 
emphasize the Founding Era in resolving current disputes concerning religion.  Moreover, 
Dawkins, Harris, and Hitchens affirmatively rely on distortions of the historical record pertaining 
to the Founders.  Finally, as to the general significance of developments since the Founding Era, 
one should not overlook the critical work of Philip Hamburger, who argues that a broad notion of 
separation reflects not the actual intent of the Founders, but rather principally results from mid-
nineteenth century anti-Catholicism.  See PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND 
STATE 9-11, 193-94, 481-83 (2002). 
47
 Philip Hamburger, who details how the separation metaphor came to encapsulate an erroneous 
view of the Founders’ understanding of the proper relationship between religion and the civil state, 
HAMBURGER, supra note 46, passim, questions whether the metaphor can ever be restored to 
helpfulness:  
[I]t seems to me that however “separation of church and state” was intended 
by Jefferson or anyone else, it is a standard that has tended to leave many 
openings for prejudiced understandings and theological discrimination, and 
it therefore seems necessary to ask whether even cautious, moderate 
arguments for separation will end up giving legitimacy to a phrase that is 
likely to be used by other persons in very different ways. 
E-mail from Philip Hamburger, Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law, to Samuel 
W. Calhoun, Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law (Feb. 6, 2008) (on 
file with the author).  See HAMBURGER, supra note 46, at 488-89.       
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wrote “a democratic and republican constitution that made no mention of god and 
that mentioned religion only when guaranteeing that it would always be separated 
from the state.”
48
  Dawkins believes that “the founders most certainly were 
secularists who believed in keeping religion out of politics.”
49
  Harris, who wrote 
Letter to a Christian Nation “to arm secularists in our society, who believe that 
religion should be kept out of public policy,”
50
 suggests that Attorney General 
John Ashcroft was unable properly to enforce separation of church and state 
because he had the “habit of saying things like ‘We are a nation called to defend 
freedom—freedom that is not the grant of any government or document, but is our 
endowment from God.’”
51
  Harris apparently expects this language to evoke 
shocked incredulity from his readers, perhaps along the lines of “How Medieval!”  
But, to the educated reader, Ashcroft’s words will sound familiar.  Jefferson 
conveyed the same idea in the Declaration’s famous second paragraph
52
 and in a 
later work again used language that clearly foreshadows Ashcroft’s: “And can the 
liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their only firm 





                                                 
48
 HITCHENS, supra note 24, at 268. 
49
 DAWKINS, supra note 22, at 41. 
50
 HARRIS, LETTER, supra note 23, at viii.  
51
 HARRIS, END OF FAITH, supra note 23, at 154.     
52
 See supra text accompanying note 27.  The paragraph continues that the purpose of government 
is to protect these God-given rights and that failure to do so justifies revolution.  See infra notes 
60-61 and accompanying text. 
53
 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 163 (William Peden ed., 1955) (1787).  
President John F. Kennedy, in his inaugural address, prefigured Ashcroft’s language even more 
closely by referring to the “revolutionary belief for which our forebears fought . . . the belief that 
the rights of man come not from the generosity of the state but from the hand of God.”  John F. 
Kennedy, ‘The torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans’ (Jan. 20, 1961), in THE 
PENGUIN BOOK OF TWENTIETH CENTURY SPEECHES 300, 301 (Brian MacArthur ed., 1992).  
Kennedy went on to pledge that “a new generation of Americans . . . [would be] unwilling to 
witness or permit the slow undoing of these human rights to which this nation has always been 
committed, and to which we are committed today at home and around the world.”  Id..  See GARY 
SCOTT SMITH, FAITH AND THE PRESIDENCY: FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH 
265 (2006).  Since what Kennedy and Ashcroft said is virtually identical, Harris presumably 
would be forced to conclude that Kennedy also was unable to enforce separation of church and 
state.  For an argument that Kennedy, who ended his inaugural address with the assertion “that 
here on earth God’s work must truly be our own,” ‘The torch,’ supra at 303, in fact understood the 
concept of “separation of church and state” much differently than Harris, Hitchens, and Dawkins, 
see infra note 78.                 
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Harris apparently would have us believe that Jefferson did not properly 
understand how to separate church from state.  Any such obtuseness would be 
especially ironic, since the phrase, “separation of church and state,” comes from 
Jefferson’s 1802 message to the Danbury Baptist Association.  This document 
shows that it is Dawkins, Harris, and Hitchens who misunderstand the notion of 
separation.  Jefferson describes the intended impact of the First Amendment’s 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses as “building a wall of separation 
between Church and State,”
54
 not Religion and State.
55
  He also explains that he 
views these Clauses “with sovereign reverence” because “religion is a matter 
which lies solely between man and his God, that he owes account to none other 
for his faith or his worship, that the [legitimate] powers of government reach 
actions only, and not opinions.”
56
  Jefferson’s language thus demonstrates that his 
                                                 
54
 Address of Thomas Jefferson to Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), in LIFE AND 
SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 36, at 332, 332. 
55
 Daniel Dreisbach sees great significance in  
Jefferson’s use of the word “church” rather than “religion” in his restatement 
of the First Amendment [in the Danbury letter] . . . [It] emphasized that the 
constitutional separation was between ecclesiastical institutions and the civil 
state.  His choice of language, no doubt, appealed to pious, evangelical 
Protestant dissenters who disapproved of established churches but believed 
religion played an indispensable role in public life.   
Daniel L. Dreisbach, “Sowing Useful Truths and Principles”: The Danbury Baptists, Thomas 
Jefferson, and the “Wall of Separation,” 39 J. CHURCH & STATE 455, 471 (1997).  Elsewhere, 
Dreisbach argues that Jefferson did not even “intend his metaphor [wall of separation] to represent 
a universal principle on the prudential and constitutional relationship between religion and all civil 
government.  Rather, it served to delineate the constitutional jurisdictions of the federal and state 
governments, respectively, on religious matters.”  Daniel L. Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson and the 
Danbury Baptists Revisited, 56 WM. & MARY Q. 805, 811 (1999).  See DANIEL L. DREISBACH, 
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 55-70 (2002). 
56
 Address of Thomas Jefferson, supra note 54, at 332 (this source erroneously substitutes the 
word “legislative” for “legitimate,” a common mistake; see Dreisbach, “Sowing Useful Truths,” 
supra note 55, at 468 & n.30).  The dichotomy between beliefs and actions is typically 
Jeffersonian.  In Virginia’s Statute for Religious Freedom, he wrote “that it is time enough for the 
rightful purposes of civil government, for its officers to interfere when principles break out into 
overt acts against peace and good order.”  The Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom, in THE 
VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY xviii (Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan eds., 1988).  Perhaps a more famous 
passage is from his Notes on the State of Virginia: “The legitimate powers of government extend 
to such acts only as are injurious to others.  But it does me no injury for my neighbour to say there 
are twenty gods, or no god.  It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.”  JEFFERSON, NOTES, 
supra note 53, at 159.  This latter statement “probably caused [Jefferson] more difficulty than 
anything else he said or did during his entire lifetime,” id. at 291 n.7, for it led to the charge of 
atheism, id., a charge that was plainly untrue.  See supra notes 29, 43; infra notes 59; 65 and 
accompanying text.        
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wall is meant to insulate religious beliefs and practices from legislative 
interference,
57
 not to separate religion from politics.   
 
Other evidence confirms that Jefferson never intended to insulate politics from 
religion.
58
  The Declaration itself is clear proof.
59
  One can hardly imagine an act 
                                                 
57
 The context of Jefferson’s message to the Baptists shows that the legislative abuse he most 
likely had in mind was an established religion.  “Baptists had to sign certificates as to their 
minority status in order to avoid paying taxes for support of the Congregationalist religious 
majority in each town, and therefore Baptists resented the establishments and looked to Jefferson 
for support.”  HAMBURGER, supra note 46, at 156; see Thomas E. Buckley, Reflections on a Wall, 
56 WM. & MARY Q. 795, 797 (1999).  Jefferson’s extreme wariness of religious establishments is 
also evident in his famous statement that he had “sworn upon the altar of God, eternal hostility 
against every form of tyranny over the mind of man,” which appears in a letter condemning 
renewed efforts by certain denominations to obtain “an establishment of a particular form of 
Christianity through the United States.”  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Benjamin Rush 
(Sept. 23, 1800), in LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 36, at 557-58.  See Edwin S. 
Gaustad, Thomas Jefferson, Danbury Baptists, and “Eternal Hostility,” 56 WM. & MARY Q. 801, 
802 (1999).  But see HAMBURGER, supra note 46, at 148 (arguing that this language demonstrates 
that Jefferson feared not only religious establishments, but also the threat of “mental tyranny” 
posed by the clergy).   
 Philip Hamburger, as just noted, well understands that the context of Jefferson’s Danbury 
letter was a complaint about religious establishments.  Nonetheless, he interprets the letter as 
calling for a broader separation between religion and politics.  See id. at 155-62; 109-10.  For 
reasons already given, supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text, I do not agree with Hamburger 
on this point.  I do agree, however, with his argument that Jefferson’s notion of separation (as 
conceived by Hamburger) was not the religious liberty the First Amendment was intended to 
protect, see HAMBURGER, supra note 46, at 9-10, 101-07, and also with his assertion that this 
broader view of separation was not embraced by the Baptist recipients of the Danbury letter.  See 
id. at 163-80.    
58
 Thus, I disagree with Philip Hamburger’s conclusion that Jefferson sought not only to separate 
“church from state,” but also “religion from politics.”  HAMBURGER, supra note 46, at 155.  
Hamburger’s principal evidence is an unsent 1815 letter in which Jefferson argues that pastors 
generally “should not have ‘the right of discussing public affairs in the pulpit.’”  Id. at 151.  The 
letter “suggests how [Jefferson’s] advocacy of separation may have been a response not merely to 
the New England establishments, but to the bondage of clerical influence in a society in which 
steady habits, Federalist politics, and clerical authority were closely intertwined.”  Id.; see id. at 
148, 485.  Jefferson’s letter does not substantiate Hamburger’s assertion.  First, it addresses only 
the appropriate role of the clergy, and therefore has limited usefulness in revealing Jefferson’s 
overall view on the proper role for religion in politics.  Second, even with respect to the clergy, 
Jefferson’s rationale was not the separation of church and state, but rather the curious point that 
clergy were, on the basis of their contractual duties to their congregations, bound to limit their 
pulpit remarks to their area of expertise—religion.  See id. at 152-54, 181.  If a pastor’s entire 
congregation agreed that the pastor could offer instruction from the pulpit on the subjects of law 
and politics, or if a pastor commented on such subjects only outside the pulpit, Jefferson offered 
no objection.  Id. at 154 n.18.  Third, Hamburger’s assertion does not take into account other 
evidence showing that Jefferson, in his own words and actions, did not keep religion separated 
from politics.  See Thomas E. Buckley, Thomas Jefferson and the Myth of Separation, in 
RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 39, 43-47 (Mark J. Rozell & Gleaves Whitney eds., 
2007); infra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.  
59
 Other evidence for this claim is that Jefferson, “[t]hroughout his political career and particularly 
during his presidency . . . repeatedly wove expressions of religious belief into his public 
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more “political” than the formation of a new government.  This new government 
was necessary to protect unalienable rights endowed by the Creator.
60
  It was the 
King’s usurpation of these rights that justified the Revolution.
61
  Consequently, if 
“separation” means the insulation of politics from religion, the Declaration itself 
violates the principle of separation of church and state. 
 
Jefferson also mixed religion and politics in his early unsuccessful attempts to 
fight slavery legislatively.  In the 1780s, he “envisioned a program of gradual 
abolition that featured an end to the slave trade, the prohibition of slavery in all 
the western territories and the establishment of a fixed date . . . after which all 
newly born children of slaves would be emancipated.”
62
  What motivated 
Jefferson?  Joseph Ellis cites “the incompatibility of slavery with the principles on 
which the American republic was founded.”
63
  This explanation is 
unobjectionable, but these founding beliefs can hardly be called secular.  As has 
been shown, a chief principle of the American republic, enshrined in the 1776 
Declaration, was the belief that God granted unalienable rights to all mankind.
64
  
Jefferson later gave equally irrefutable evidence that his moral condemnation of 
slavery was premised in his religious beliefs.  He feared the wrath of God against 
the country on account of slavery: “Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect 
                                                                                                                                     
statements.”  Buckley, supra note 57, at 797.  These expressions included repeated invitations to 
“his fellow citizens to give thanks to God,” id. at 799, and frequent “acknowledgement of God’s 
providential design.”  Id. These facts lead Buckley to conclude that “to treat Jefferson as a herald 
of twentieth-century secularism is to read him dogmatically and falsely.  He used the consecrated 
phrase ‘wall of separation’ in writing about church and state, not religion and government.  In 
sharp contrast to some modern historians and legal scholars, he never conflated those couplets.”  
Id. at 800.  See JON MEACHAM, AMERICAN GOSPEL: GOD, THE FOUNDING FATHERS, AND THE 
MAKING OF A NATION 19 (2006) (“The wall Jefferson referred to is designed to divide church from 
state, not religion from politics.”); id. at 105 (“Jefferson unabashedly called on God for guidance 
and blessing in difficult times.  In his second inaugural address, he charted the relationship 
between God and America in some detail, and asked God to begin a new chapter in that story . . . 
.”). 
60
 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  It is immaterial that Jefferson was 
not the original source of this phrase.  See supra note 27.     
61
 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  The whole point of the Declaration’s 
famous second paragraph was to assert “the right of revolution, which was, after all, the right 
Americans were exercising in 1776.”  MAIER, supra note 27, at 135.      
62
 JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 145 (1996). 
63
 Id. at 146. 
64
 See supra text accompanying note 27.  For Abraham Lincoln’s theological interpretation of this 
concept, see infra text accompanying note 72.          
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that God is just: that his justice cannot sleep for ever: that considering numbers, 
nature and natural means only, a revolution of the wheel of fortune, an exchange 
of situation, is among possible events . . . The Almighty has no attribute which 
can take side with us in such a contest.”
65
  To forestall God’s judgment, Jefferson 
hoped that “total emancipation” would soon come “with the consent of the 




Jefferson’s frequent mixing of religion and politics is representative of the other 
Founders.
67
  The question remains, however, whether this practice continued 
beyond the Founding Era. 
 
(C) TWO MORE CENTURIES OF INTERMINGLED RELIGION AND POLITICS 
Religion and politics have been intermingled continuously since the Founding 
Era.  This is readily shown by the examples of Abraham Lincoln and Martin 
Luther King Jr. 
 
(1) Abraham Lincoln 
President Bush’s critics excoriate him for what would seem to be an innocuous 
act—relying upon principles taken straight from the Declaration—that both life 
                                                 
65
 JEFFERSON, NOTES, supra note 53, at 163.  This quote in itself convincingly refutes any notion 
that Jefferson had a deistic conception of God.  If God does not interact with humankind, why 
should Jefferson have feared God’s justice?  See Buckley, supra note 58, at 44 (providing other 
evidence that “Jefferson took God seriously”).  Christopher Hitchens argues that he was needlessly 
anxious—Jefferson’s statement is “as incoherent as it is memorable: given the marvel of a god 
who was also just there would be, in the long term, nothing much to tremble about.”  HITCHENS, 
supra note 24, at 177.  Hitchens apparently has a very high view of his own capacity to withstand 
a just evaluation.  Abraham Lincoln was not so dismissive of Jefferson’s concern about God’s 
justice, but instead relied on it to rebut Stephen Douglas in their famous 1858 debates.  Douglas 
asserted that since Thomas Jefferson never freed his slaves, he could not have meant to include 
“the negro” when asserting “the equality of all men” in the Declaration.  Abraham Lincoln, Fifth 
Debate With Stephen A. Douglas, at Galesburg, Illinois (Oct. 7, 1858), in 3 THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 207, 216 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).  Lincoln countered by 
reminding “Judge Douglas and this audience, that while Mr. Jefferson was the owner of slaves . . . 
he used the strong language that ‘he trembled for his country when he remembered that God was 
just.’”  Id. at 220.  Lincoln attributed the Founders’ failure to free the slaves to the fact that “they 
knew no way to get rid of [slavery] at that time.”  Abraham Lincoln, Sixth Debate With Stephen 
A. Douglas, at Quincy, Illinois (Oct. 13, 1858), in id. at 245, 276.                           
66
 JEFFERSON, NOTES, supra note 53, at 163.  It is interesting that Lincoln, in his famous Second 
Inaugural, elaborated on the theme of God’s judgment against the nation due to slavery.  See infra 
note 74.   
67
 See supra note 45. 
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itself and the right to life are gifts from the Creator.
68
  How much more then 
should these same critics condemn Lincoln, who, in expressing his opposition to 
slavery,
69
 explicitly invoked religion much more than Bush did in his stem cell 
vetoes.
70
  To be sure, Lincoln often cited the Declaration’s assertion that all men 
are created equal without theological elaboration,
71
 as did Bush.  But Lincoln 
sometimes went much further.  A striking example is his 1858 explanation of the 
Founders’ “created equal” and “unalienable rights” terminology: 
This was their majestic interpretation of the economy of the Universe.  
This was their lofty, and wise, and noble understanding of the justice of 
the Creator to His creatures.  Yes, gentlemen, to all His creatures, to the 
whole great family of man.  In their enlightened belief, nothing stamped 
                                                 
68
 See supra text accompanying note 6.  
69
 Lincoln, of course, used religious language for purposes other than attacking slavery.  His 
various executive proclamations are striking examples.  For instance, in 1863 he designated a day 
for national prayer and humiliation in language that could have just as readily been heard in a 
pulpit.  See Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation Appointing a National Fast Day (Mar. 30, 1863), in 6 
COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 65, at 155-56.       
70
 As Professor Michael Nelson reminds us, presidential piety in public often has “little to do with 
piety.”   Michael Nelson, Introduction to WILLIAM E. BARTON, THE SOUL OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 
xv, xxxvi (U. Ill. Press 2005) (1920).  Perhaps Lincoln invoked religion disingenuously, which 
this essay argues is an inappropriate use of religion.  See supra note 18.  What were Lincoln’s 
personal religious beliefs?  Adam Gopnik writes that this is “the most vexed question in all the 
Lincoln literature.”  Adam Gopnik, Angels and Ages: Lincoln’s Language and Its Legacy, THE 
NEW YORKER, May 28, 2007, at 30, 34.  This may well be true, but Gopnik inaccurately concludes 
that Lincoln “was all his life . . . a profound and declared skeptic.”  See id. (a mistake also made 
by Hitchens, HITCHENS, supra note 24, at 179).  The evidence is plainly to the contrary.  
Testimony gathered by Lincoln’s law partner, William Herndon, indicates that Lincoln as a young 
man indeed had serious qualms about orthodox Christian beliefs.  See William H. Herndon & 
Jesse W. Weik, HERNDON’S LIFE OF LINCOLN: THE HISTORY AND PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 354-56 (Da Capo 1983) (1889).  But Lincoln gradually experienced a 
deepening of his faith, in large part precipitated by personal tragedies.  The first spiritually 
significant event was the 1850 death of his son Eddie.  See Nelson, supra, at xxix-xxxi.   Just over 
a decade later, the 1862 death of his son Willie led Lincoln “increasingly [to] turn[] to religion for 
solace.”  DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 337 (1995).  By 1864, as Lincoln “[i]ncreasingly . . . 
brooded over the war and his role in it . . . he drew from the Scriptures such solace that he was 
prepared to forget his earlier religious doubts.”  Id. at 514.  Lincoln expert Paul Angle writes that 
“there can be little question but that during the last years of his life Lincoln went through a 
spiritual development with which his former partner was unfamiliar.”  Paul M. Angle, Editor’s 
Preface to HERNDON’S LIFE, supra, at xiii¸ xlv.  The exact nature of Lincoln’s beliefs is not 
relevant to this essay, see supra note 38, but it is important to recognize that by the 1850s, when 
Lincoln’s political career was revitalized, he had become profoundly religious, with a deep faith in 
a theistic God.  Hitchens’ suggestion that Lincoln never lost “a tendency to deism,” HITCHENS, 
supra note 24, at 179, is false.  Quite apart from the facts already mentioned in this note, the 
Second Inaugural in itself stands as stunning refutation.  See infra note 74.                     
71
 E.g., Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, Illinois (June 26, 1857), in 2 COLLECTED 
WORKS, supra note 65, at 398, 406-07; Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Peoria, Illinois (Oct. 16, 
1854), in id. at 247, 266.   
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with the Divine image and likeness was sent into the world to be trodden 




Beyond relying on the Declaration, Lincoln believed that slavery violated Jesus’ 
command that we treat others as we would like to be treated.
73
  He also insisted 
that slavery contradicted the Bible’s teaching on the nature of work. For example, 
in the famous Second Inaugural,
74
 Lincoln said, in reference to the prayers of 
Southerners:  “It may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God’s 




                                                 
72
 Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Lewistown, Illinois (Aug. 17, 1858), in id. at 544, 546.  This 
language makes it irrefutably clear that, to Lincoln, the Declaration’s pronouncement of human 
equality could in no way be characterized as secular.  (By the way, one wonders whether, to 
Lincoln, “the whole great family of man” would include human embryos.)         
73
 Letter to George B. Ide, James R. Doolittle, and A. Hubbell (May 30, 1864), in 7 COLLECTED 
WORKS, supra note 65, at 368.  See Speech to One Hundred Fortieth Indiana Regiment (Mar. 17, 
1865), in 8 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 65, at 360, 361; Fragment on Pro-slavery Theology 
(Oct. 1, 1858?), in 3 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 65, at 204, 205.      
74
 Often hailed as Lincoln’s greatest speech, e.g., RONALD C. WHITE, JR., LINCOLN’S GREATEST 
SPEECH: THE SECOND INAUGURAL (2002), the Second Inaugural is, as Jon Meacham observes, 
“startling in its religiosity.”  MEACHAM, supra note 59, at 121.  “More than any of [Lincoln’s] 
other speeches . . . [it] fused spiritual faith with politics.”  DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF 
RIVALS: THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 699 (2005).  It is “the greatest example of 
Lincoln’s religious politics . . . plac[ing] God’s purposes in the American Civil War front and 
center.”  Lucas E. Morel, Lincoln’s Political Religion and Religious Politics: Or, What Lincoln 
Teaches Us about the Proper Connection between Religion and Politics, in RELIGION AND THE 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, supra note 58, at 73, 82.  Most astounding to modern ears, Lincoln 
surmises that the Civil War is God’s punishment against both the North and South for the 
“‘offense’” of slavery.  Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865), in 8 
COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 65, at 332, 333.  The severity of this speculation belies any notion 
that Lincoln spoke religiously only to curry favor with a religious audience.  Moreover, there is 
ample evidence, both before and after the speech, that Lincoln actually believed what he said.  See, 
e.g., Abraham Lincoln, Meditation on the Divine Will (Sept. 2, 1862?), in 5 COLLECTED WORKS, 
supra note 65, at 403-04; Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Albert G. Hodges (Apr. 4, 1864), in 7 
COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 65, at 281, 282; Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Thurlow Weed 
(Mar. 15, 1865), in 8 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 65, at 356, 356.  Lincoln thus shared 
“Jefferson’s belief in a just God who is not oblivious to the injustices committed by those created 
in His image and who will eventually mete out His wrath on the offenders.”  LUCAS E. MOREL, 
LINCOLN’S SACRED EFFORT: DEFINING RELIGION’S ROLE IN AMERICAN SELF-GOVERNMENT 189 
(2000).  See id. at 188, 195; supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. 
75
 Lincoln, Second Inaugural, supra note 74, at 333.  Other examples abound.  E.g., Story Written 
for Noah Brooks (Dec. 6, 1864), in 8 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 65, at 154, 155; Speech at 
Springfield, Illinois (July 17, 1858), in 2 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 65, at 504, 520; Letter, 
supra note 73. Theologian William Wolf contends that Lincoln “preferred in his later years to 
express his objection to slavery in terms of a biblical understanding of work rather than in his 
earlier derivation of it from the ‘self-evident truths’ of creation.”  WILLIAM J. WOLF, THE ALMOST 
CHOSEN PEOPLE: A STUDY OF THE RELIGION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 177 (1959).  See id. at 102-




 reveal that the principles of freedom and 
equality for African-Americans are not secular concepts.
77
  Martin Luther King Jr. 
provides further corroboration of this fact. 
 
(2) Martin Luther King Jr. 
Martin Luther King Jr. obviously was not an elected official, but his actions were 
intended to and actually had a tremendous impact on the laws of the nation.  
President John F. Kennedy, in his June 1963 speech on Civil Rights, clearly 
echoed King’s attack on racial inequality.  To Kennedy, the country was 
“confronted primarily with a moral issue.  It is as old as the Scriptures and is as 
clear as the American Constitution.”
78
  This two-pronged critique is vintage King, 
                                                 
76
 The religious premises for Lincoln’s opposition to slavery demonstrate the inaccuracy of the 
claim that Lincoln “did not mix religion and statesmanship.”  MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN ENCYCLOPEDIA 261 (1982).  Lincoln plainly did not believe the Constitution requires 
that religion be separated from politics, and he has not escaped criticism for infusing his politics 
with his faith.  Edgar Lee Masters believed that Lincoln “wedded religious cant to conservative 
politics.” Id. at 206.  H.L. Mencken thought that Lincoln’s “‘most memorable feat . . . was his 
appointment of the Lord God Jehova to the honorary chairmanship of the Republican National 
Committee.’”  Id. at 207.  
77
 That Lincoln opposed slavery for religious reasons is particularly striking in view of Garry 
Wills’s thesis in his Pulitzer Prize-winning Lincoln at Gettysburg.  Lincoln, in his Gettysburg 
Address, “performed one of the most daring acts of open-air sleight-of-hand ever witnessed by the 
unsuspecting.  Everyone in that vast throng of thousands was having his or her intellectual pocket 
picked.”  GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA 38 
(1992).  In a “clever assault on the constitutional past,” id. at 39, Lincoln undertook nothing less 
than “a new founding of the nation,” id., by which he put the Declaration’s “central proposition, 
equality, in a newly favored position as a principle of the Constitution.”  Id. at 145.  He thereby 
corrected the Constitution, which he viewed as only a provisional and flawed embodiment of the 
“permanent ideal” of human equality expressed in the Declaration.  Id. at 101; see id. at 39, 86-87.   
 If Wills is correct, one must necessarily conclude that the Gettysburg Address is an 
astonishing example of imposition of religious faith—for religious reasons, Lincoln substituted a 
new Constitution for the one his audience had brought to Gettysburg.  See id. at 38.  Wills, 
however, goes too far by suggesting that the Gettysburg Address, in itself, somehow effected a 
change in the Constitution.  Wills in fact recognizes that Lincoln knew the Constitution could only 
actually be changed by a constitutional amendment.  See id. at 136-38, 144.  Wills thus is on 
firmer ground when he refers to the Address as effectuating an “intellectual revolution,” id. at 40, 
147, 175, by best stating what Lincoln had been doing for much of the 1850s, “repeatedly relating 
all the most sensitive issues of the day to the Declaration’s supreme principle.”  Id. at 120; see id. 
at 39-40.  Even though the Gettysburg Address did not actually alter the Constitution, Lincoln still 
stands as a prime example of one willing to impose his religious faith—by forcing his religiously 
based moral condemnation of slavery upon dissenters via the Thirteenth Amendment.  For a more 
extreme example of Lincoln’s willingness to impose his views, see infra note 136.     
78
 John F. Kennedy, Address (June 11, 1963), in LET FREEDOM RING: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE  MODERN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 117, 118 (Peter B. Levy ed., 1992).  The speech has 
been called “one of the most important presidential speeches on race relations in the history of the 
United States.”  Commentary, id. at 117.  To Kennedy, “[t]he heart of the question is whether all 
Americans are to be afforded equal rights and equal opportunities; whether we are going to treat 
 20 
as evidenced by his Letter from Birmingham Jail,
79
 in which King cites both the 
Constitution and religious faith in condemning racial discrimination, but 
emphasizes religious arguments.  To complaints that “the Negro community” 
should wait before engaging in direct action, King said it had already “waited for 
more than 340 years for [its] constitutional and God-given rights.”
80
  To criticism 
                                                                                                                                     
our fellow Americans as we want to be treated.”  Address, id. at 118.  (For how Lincoln relied on 
this same (religious) principle in criticizing slavery, see supra text accompanying note 73).  Earlier 
in his speech, Kennedy recalled the nation’s founding “on the principle that all men are created 
equal.”  Id. at 117.  Referring to “the Scriptures” and to the Declaration, which indisputably has a 
theistic premise, see supra text accompanying notes 27, 60, is hardly keeping faith out of politics.  
Kennedy apparently saw no contradiction between these manifestations of faith and his earlier 
assertion, as a presidential candidate, that he believed in “an America where the separation of 
church and state is absolute.”  Senator John F. Kennedy, Address to the Greater Houston 
Ministerial Association (Sept. 12, 1960), in RANDALL BALMER, GOD IN THE WHITE HOUSE: A 
HISTORY 175, 176-80 (2008).  For Thomas Jefferson’s similar understanding of the principle of 
“separation,” see supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.Some might argue that Kennedy is a 
poor example of a political leader who mixed religion and politics—both the depth of his faith and 
its impact on his public policy decisions have been questioned.  See GRETCHEN RUBIN, FORTY 
WAYS TO LOOK AT JFK 107 (2005); SMITH, supra note 53, at 261, 277-79.  There is indeed some 
basis for skepticism.  But there is also countervailing evidence.  See RUBIN, supra, at 93, 112; 
SMITH, supra note 53, at 260-61.  One fact is uncontroversial—Kennedy frequently relied upon 
religion in his public life.  The Kennedy Inaugural, see supra note 53, and the Civil Rights speech 
are only two of many examples.  See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 53, at 264-66.  If these many 
religious references were disingenuous, i.e., included only to achieve some political advantage, 
Kennedy would be a prime example of the inappropriate mixing of religion and politics.  See 
supra note 18.  The evidence, however, is too indeterminate to warrant this conclusion.        
79
 The April 1963 letter was a response to a published statement from “a group of white clergymen 
who urged him and Birmingham’s blacks to stop demonstrating.”  LET FREEDOM RING, supra note 
78, at 109.   King soon thereafter published it as a book chapter.  Martin Luther King Jr., Letter 
from Birmingham Jail, in MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 76-95 (1964).    It is 
unclear if Kennedy read King’s Letter prior to his June 11 Civil Rights speech.  He likely did, as 
the Letter was published in the New York Post several weeks before.  TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING 
THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63, at 804 (1988).  Moreover, Attorney General 
Robert Kennedy, the President’s brother, had a copy of the Letter.  STEPHEN B. OATES, LET THE 
TRUMPET SOUND: THE LIFE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 230 (1982).  Regardless, King’s 
influence on Kennedy is undeniable.  Taylor Branch says that King’s “urgings” may have led to 
Kennedy’s speech.  BRANCH, supra, at 822-23.  The evidence Branch cites is clearly supportive.  
On June 10, the New York Times published King’s plea that “above all the President must start 
talking of integration in moral terms,” Dr. King Attacks Kennedy Record, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 
1963, at 20; see BRANCH, supra, at 822-23, and very early on June 11, King telegraphed Robert 
Kennedy imploring the Administration to act.  Id. at 995 n.822.  It was later that same day that the 
President reached the “extraordinary decision to make what amounted to an extemporaneous civil 
rights address on national television.”  Id. at 823.  Whether or not King’s “urgings” directly 
determined the timing of Kennedy’s speech (he was also influenced by watching a replay of 
Governor George Wallace’s “defiance” at the University of Alabama; RUBIN, supra note 78, at 
25), King definitely impacted the speech’s content.  Branch writes that the Civil Rights speech 
“embraced, even imitated, King’s message.”  Id. at 834.  Stephen Oates would agree: “Watching 
Kennedy on television, King was elated, because the President’s argument was identical to what 
King had been saying in his own speeches and writings for two years now.”  OATES, supra at 244.             
80
 King, Letter, supra note 79, at 78, 81.   
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for breaking the law, King said that segregation laws, because they did not 
“square[] with the moral law or the law of God,” were unjust and thus properly 
disobeyed.
81
  King exhorted white moderates “to be co-workers with God” to 
achieve equal rights.
82
  He criticized white ministers who argued that “racial and 
economic injustice . . . [were] ‘social issues, with which the gospel has no real 
concern.’”
83
  This view reflected “a strange, un-Biblical distinction between body 
and soul, between the sacred and the secular.”
84
  King called for a return to the 
days when “the [Christian] church was not merely a thermometer that recorded 
the ideas and principles of popular opinion . . . [but instead] was a thermostat that 
transformed the mores of society . . . [for example, by] end[ing] . . . such ancient 
evils as infanticide and gladiatorial contests.”
85
  Despite his disappointment in 
white moderates and the white church, King was confident of ultimate success: 
“If the inexpressible cruelties of slavery could not stop us, the opposition we now 
face will surely fail.  We will win our freedom because the sacred heritage of our 
nation and the eternal will of God are embodied in our echoing demands.”
86
  One 
day, the South would recognize that the protestors who “sat down at lunch 
counters . . . were in reality standing up for what is best in the American dream 
and for the most sacred values in our Judaeo-Christian heritage.”
87
   
 
Given the overwhelming evidence of the centrality of King’s Christian faith to the 
struggle for civil rights,
88
 it is amusing to watch Dawkins, Harris, and Hitchens 
squirm to depreciate the role of Christianity in King’s life.  Dawkins asserts that 
King’s religion was “incidental” to his “good deeds” in fighting racism: 
“Although . . . [he] was a Christian, he derived his philosophy of non-violent civil 
                                                 
81
 See id. at 82-84.    
82
 Id. at 86.   
83
 Id. at 90.   
84
 Id. at 90. 
85
 Id. at 91.  (One wonders whether King would have viewed “infanticide” as encompassing the 
deliberate destruction of human embryos.)   
86
 Id. at 93.   
87
 Id. at 94.                    
88
 There is, of course, voluminous additional evidence, such as King’s 1963 “I Have a Dream” 
speech and his 1965 “Our God Is Marching On!” speech.  See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE 
OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 48-49, 227-
28 (1993); LET FREEDOM RING, supra note 78, at 122-25, 162-64. 
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disobedience directly from Gandhi, who was not.”
89
  Harris makes the same 
argument.
90
  That Gandhi greatly influenced King does nothing to diminish 
Christianity’s surpassing impact.  As the Letter from Birmingham Jail makes 
clear, the reason King opposed racism was its incompatibility with God’s moral 
law.  Moreover, the Letter itself does not credit Gandhi for King’s chosen tactic of 
non-violent direct action, but says instead: “I am grateful to God that, through the 
influence of the Negro church, the way of nonviolence became an integral part of 
our struggle.”
91
  Hitchens deserves special criticism for his treatment of King.  
While admitting King’s “professed theology,”
92
 Hitchens concludes that “[i]n no 
real as opposed to nominal sense . . . was [King] a Christian.”
93
  Surely it is the 
height of presumption and arrogance for anyone, especially an atheist like 





The examples of Lincoln and King establish, as a matter of descriptive fact, that 
since the Founding Era, religion and politics have been continually intermixed in 
American public life.
95
  Their examples also speak, however, to the question of 
                                                 
89
 DAWKINS, supra note 22, at 271. 
90
 HARRIS, LETTER, supra note 23, at 12. 
91
 King, Letter, supra note 79, at 87. 
92
 HITCHENS, supra note 24, at 180. 
93
 Id. at 176. 
94
 See supra text accompanying note 44.  In any event, Hitchens fails to understand Christianity.  
His specific reason for labeling King a “nominal” Christian is that King was gentle, while 
Christianity, as perceived by Hitchens, encourages violence.  HITCHENS, supra note 24, at 175-76.  
Hitchens’ evidence is that Christianity teaches everlasting punishment for non-believers.  See id.  
The Christian concept of Hell has no logical connection to how Christians are commanded to treat 
non-believers in this world.  As King correctly understood, Jesus, rather than modeling violence, 
was “an extremist for love: ‘Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that 
hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you.’”  King, Letter, supra 
note 79, at 88. 
95
 One can acknowledge this fact, but maintain that this continual intermixing contravenes the 
principle of separation of church and state.  This is the position of historian Gordon Wood.  He 
writes that during “the 1830s and 1840s . . . [e]vangelical Christians mounted crusade after 
crusade against a host of evils, including removal of the Cherokee Indians, lotteries, excessive 
drinking, bad prison and orphanage conditions, and, most important, slavery.  Gordon S. Wood, 
Praying with the Founders, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, May 1, 2008, at 52, 55.  While 
suggesting that these efforts helped the country, Wood nonetheless believes this “inva[sion] [of] 
the public square” violated “the idea of a wall of separation.”  Id.  This essay demonstrates that 
Wood’s conception of the wall is incorrect.  The wall was never intended to separate religion from 
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whether this intermingling is normatively appropriate.  Since Lincoln and King 
were instrumental in the fight for African-American freedom and equality, the 
answer would seem to be a resounding “yes.”  Some have argued, however, that it 
is wrong for religious believers to live out their faith in the political sphere.  This 




II. THERE ARE NO PERSUASIVE NORMATIVE GROUNDS FOR EXCLUDING 
FAITH-BASED ARGUMENTS AND ACTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC SQUARE 
Although the Founders, Lincoln, and King did not hesitate to invoke religious 
faith, maybe they were wrong to do so.  Perhaps there are valid reasons for 
generally wanting to exclude religious discourse and religiously motivated actions 
from the public square. 
 
(A) IRRATIONALITY 
One reason for singling out religious viewpoints for exclusion may be evident in 
the very phrase, “religious faith.”  Sam Harris writes “that faith is nothing more 
than the license religious people give one another to keep believing when reasons 
                                                                                                                                     
politics.  See supra notes 45-67 and accompanying text.  I would thus agree with Professor 
William Lee Miller:  
The separating of church from state certainly has not meant—despite some 
shrill cries that it should—the separating of religion from politics.  Far from 
it.  Churches and churchgoers have been active in American politics and 
social policy on explicit religious grounds from the American Revolution 
through the abolition movement and the Civil War and the Social Gospel and 
the gospel of wealth and the Prohibition movement and the pacifist 
movement and the Civil Rights Movement . . . and a great deal I am leaving 
out, down to the Moral Majority and the outbreak of a conservative Christian 
movement in the present day.  There are protests, but the pattern is that one 
objects to religion in politics when one disagrees with the political position 
taken but endorses it when one agrees with that position—a “moral” issue is 
then discerned, and religion-in-politics is then not only acceptable but 
altogether fitting. 
WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY 247 (2003).  With respect to Miller’s reference to the 
“conservative Christian movement,” there is evidence that some of its segments are already trying 
to impact areas beyond those “cultural-social issues” that, as Miller describes, generated the 
movement in the first place.  Id. at 248.  For example, Pastor Rick Warren, “author of one of the 
world’s best-selling books, The Purpose Driven Life, . . . is both leading and riding the newest 
wave of change in the Evangelical community: an expansion beyond social conservatism to causes 
such as battling poverty, opposing torture and combating global warming.”  David Van Biema, 
The Global Ambition of Rick Warren, TIME, Aug. 18, 2008, at 36, 37-38. 
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fail.  While believing strongly, without evidence, is considered a mark of madness 
or stupidity in any other area of our lives, faith in God still holds immense 
prestige in our society.”
96
  Harris suggests that all religious believers are either 
mad or stupid.  If this is in fact his belief, one could hope that he still might view 
religious believers sympathetically, as one might view an eccentric relative: 
“Good old Uncle Joe!  He’s a good soul, but crazy as a loon when it comes to (fill 
in the blank).”  Harris, though, is far from amused by religious believers’ logical 
deficiencies.
97
  Their “flagrantly irrational” beliefs are not to be laughed at, but 
rather need “eradicating.”
98
  Religious beliefs “are increasingly maladaptive.”
99
  
Parents who raise their “children to believe that they are Christian, Muslim, or 




Given how Harris views religious beliefs, it is obvious he believes faith has 
nothing useful to contribute to public debate: “We desperately need a public 
discourse that encourages critical thinking and intellectual honesty.  Nothing 
stands in the way of this project more than the respect we accord religious 
faith.”
101
  Is this credible?  Consider, for example, whether Martin Luther King’s 
                                                 
96
 HARRIS, LETTER, supra note 23, at 67.  Religious believers would of course contest Harris’s 
assertion that there is “no evidence” supporting religious belief.  My own faith, Christianity, for 
example, has centuries of sophisticated apologetics to demonstrate the faith’s reasonableness.  For 
an excellent recent book that both examines common objections to Christianity and explores the 
positive reasons supporting Christian beliefs, see TIMOTHY KELLER, THE REASON FOR GOD: 
BELIEF IN AN AGE OF SKEPTICISM (2008).       
97
 With respect to unreasonableness, Harris puts religious belief in the same category as astrology 
and alchemy (together with people who think Elvis is still alive and those who believe that “aliens 
have traversed the galaxy only to molest ranchers and their cattle”).  See HARRIS, LETTER, supra 
note 23, at 51.  Religious believers are self-deceived folk, see id. at 54, living a “fantasy life.”  See 
id. at 57.  Harris is “dumbstruck” by their “denial of tangible reality.”  See id. at 91.  John 
Micklethwait cites Harris, Dawkins, and Hitchens as examples of “secular intellectuals [who] 
think that the real ‘clash of civilisations’ is not between different religions but between 
superstition and modernity.”  Micklethwait, supra note 24, at 2.     
98
 See HARRIS, LETTER, supra note 23, at 87. 
99
 See id. at 80.   
100
 Id. at 88.  According to Dawkins, it is “preposterous” to think “it is normal and right to 
indoctrinate tiny children in the religion of their parents.”  DAWKINS, supra note 22, at 339.  
Hitchens considers religious instruction of the young as “imprint[ing] . . . [them] with . . . 
propaganda.”  HITCHENS, supra note 24, at 220.              
101
 HARRIS, LETTER, supra note 23, at 87. 
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Letter from Birmingham Jail contributed to the Civil Rights Movement.
102
  The 
Letter has been called “a classic in protest literature, the most eloquent and 
learned expression of the goals and philosophy of the nonviolent movement ever 
written.”
103
  Christopher Hitchens also admires the Letter: it “is a model of 
polemic.  Icily polite and generous-minded, it still breathes with an unquenchable 
conviction that the filthy injustice of racism must be borne no longer.”
104
  
Hitchens reaches this conclusion despite the Letter’s overwhelming religiosity,
105
 
which he never even mentions.  Hitchens apparently was able to completely filter 





Harris might respond that King’s Letter, despite its conspicuous Christianity, 
contained other types of arguments.
107
  Some appeals to religious belief stand 
alone, such as in the proverbial bumper sticker: “God said it, I believe it, That 
settles it.”  Can this type of argument possibly be legitimate?   
 
                                                 
102
 One could make the same “usefulness” inquiry not about something King wrote, but about 
King himself.  Did he contribute constructively to the Civil Rights Movement?  An affirmative 
answer is obvious.  Yet, without his Christian faith, King as we know him would not have existed.  
The same is true of Abraham Lincoln.  Without his deep religious faith, he would not have been 
the same person who spoke so profoundly about the moral wrong of slavery.   
103
 OATES, supra note 79, at 230; see LET FREEDOM RING, supra note 78, Commentary at 109 
(“one of the most profound statements on the origins and goals of the civil rights movement”).  
Taylor Branch concludes that the Letter, while having no instantaneous impact, became “a famous 
pronouncement of moral triumph.”  BRANCH, supra note 79, at 744.  For an argument that the 
Letter likely contributed to President Kennedy’s decision to make his impromptu June 1963 
televised address on Civil Rights, see supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.                
104
 HITCHENS, supra note 24, at 173. 
105
 See supra text accompanying notes 80-87. 
106
 HITCHENS, supra note 24, at 13.  Some reprints of the Letter appear designed to keep readers 
from recognizing King’s emphasis on Christianity.  See Letter from Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 
1963), in CIVIL RIGHTS AND AFRICAN AMERICANS 502-09 (Albert P. Blaustein & Robert L. 
Zangrando eds., 1991) (1968).  Not only does the editors’ introduction to the Letter fail to mention 
its pervasive religiosity, see Introduction, id. at 501, but their abridgment omits virtually all 
references to King’s faith.  Compare King, Letter, supra, with supra text accompanying notes 80-
87.       
107
 For example, King warned that the “pent-up resentments and latent frustrations” of African-
Americans would make “many streets of the South . . . flow[] with blood” if whites did not 
support “those . . . who employ[ed] nonviolent direct action.”  See King, Letter, supra note 79, at 
87-88.  For Jefferson’s analogous warning that perpetuating slavery would result in violent 
opposition by enslaved African-Americans, see supra text accompanying notes 65-66.     
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(B) “GOD SAID IT, I BELIEVE IT, THAT SETTLES IT” 
The “bumper sticker” scenario is largely a red herring.  Moral arguments in the 
public sphere seldom are expressed solely in religious terms.  President Bush, for 
example, in addition to stressing the God-given right to life, defended his first 
veto by reminding us “that we all begin our lives as a small collection of cells.”
108
  
He also asserted that each human embryo “is a unique human life with inherent 
dignity and matchless value.”
109
  To demonstrate this fact, the President 
introduced a number of children who began their lives “as a frozen embryo that 
was created for in vitro fertilization, but remained unused after the fertility 




What, though, about those rare situations in which only religious arguments are 
used?  To evaluate the propriety of an actual “bumper sticker” argument, one 
naturally turns to a consideration of John Rawls’s concept of proper discourse in a 
liberal democracy.
111
  Rawls would permit expressly religious arguments, but 
only when supplemented, “within a reasonable time, with what could be termed 
adequate and independent secular grounds.”
112
  This requirement of supplemental 
argumentation, labeled the “‘proviso,’”
113
 was Rawls’s “test for admissibility [of 
religious “conceptions of justice”] in public debate.”
114
  An exclusively religious 
argument would therefore be illegitimate under Rawls’s approach.  What, though, 
allows Rawls to set the conditions under which the religious can engage in public 
discourse?  As Michael McConnell states it, “[w]ith due respect to John Rawls, 
philosophical secularists are not democracy’s gatekeepers, entitled to determine 
who may participate and on what basis.”
115
   
 
                                                 
108




 Id.  For additional secular arguments for defending embryonic life, see infra note 127. 
111
 “Anyone seriously concerned today with the role of religion in public life . . . has to account 
still for where they stand in relation to Rawls.”  William J. Wagner, John Rawls’s Proffer to 
Believers: A Bargain Called, “The Idea of Public Reason,” 1 J.L. PHIL. & CUL. 13, 14 (2007).   
112
 Id. at 15. 
113
 Id. at 15 n.12 (citation omitted). 
114
 Id. at 15-16.   
115
 Michael W. McConnell, Secular Reason and the Misguided Attempt to Exclude Religious 
Argument from Democratic Deliberation, 1 J.L. PHIL. & CUL. 159, 161 (2007).   
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Rawls, of course, lacks the authority to impose his view, but he does seek to 
convince everyone that his “proviso” is “an obligation of citizenship.”
116
  “The 
basic idea . . . is clear enough.  Citizens [offering religious arguments should] be 
aware that not everyone will share their religious premises or regard their 
arguments as providing good reasons for the policies and principles they favor.  
They must therefore be ready to make good their religious arguments by 
supplementing them with . . . ‘properly public reasons.’”
117
  This is an 
unpersuasive rationale for requiring supplemental argumentation for religious 
arguments. 
 
Many types of arguments, not just religious ones, fail to provide “good reasons” 
for those who do not share the disputant’s “premises.”  The “bumper sticker” 
critique of religious arguments diverts attention from the fact that secular 
arguments are routinely made according to the “bumper sticker” model.  Consider 
Richard Dawkins’s promulgation of an “amended Ten Commandments” for the 
moral life;
118
 or Sam Harris’s statement that “[q]uestions of morality are questions 
about happiness and suffering”;
119
 or Christopher Hitchens’ assertion that “[n]o 
supernatural force [is] required to make the case against racism.”
120
  Each of these 
illustrates what Arthur Leff calls the “‘God-is-me’” approach to morality.
121
  
                                                 
116
 Paul J. Weithman, John Rawls’s Idea of Public Reason: Two Questions, 1 J.L. PHIL. & CUL. 47, 




 DAWKINS, supra note 22, at 264. 
119
 HARRIS, LETTER, supra note 23, at 8.  See id. at 18-19, 23; HARRIS, END OF FAITH, supra note 
23, at 170-71.  This “happiness/suffering” standard is completely unsubstantiated.  How would 
Harris prove wrong someone who asserted that morality consists in causing as much unhappiness 
and suffering as possible?    
120
 HITCHENS, supra note 24, at 180.  Hitchens is wrong.  Apart from a God who has decreed the 
inherent value and dignity of each human life, no convincing objection can be given to devaluing 
any group of humans.  See infra notes 121-123 and accompanying text.  Hitchens perhaps would 
respond that “Kant’s principle” would supply the objection: “‘[A]ct as if the maxim of your action 
were to become through your will a general natural law.’”  See HITCHENS, supra note 24, at 266.  
But what proof does Hitchens provide to show that Kant’s maxim is morally sound?  He merely 
declares it to be so.  For an argument that Kant fails to establish a convincing test for moral action, 
see Calhoun, supra note 19, at 45 nn. 95-96 and accompanying text.          
121
 Arthur A. Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1235-36.  As a way 
to ground normative propositions, Leff sees the “‘God-is-me’” approach as a form of “‘It is right 
to do X because P believes so’ (where P = some person or group of persons).”  Arthur A. Leff, 
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What gives these three men standing to make authoritative moral 
pronouncements?
122
  The fascinating thing is that they make very little, if any, 
attempt to substantiate their views of morality.
123
  Pure assertion is thought to be 
perfectly sufficient. 
 
Although exclusively religious arguments would be entirely appropriate,
124
 this is 
not to say they would always be wise.  Religious believers must exercise prudent 
political judgment in evaluating whether to frame their arguments in ways more 
likely to persuade those outside their faith community.  Should a public policy 
objective be defended exclusively in religious terms, the arguments will most 
likely be deemed irrelevant by those outside the faith.
125
  This, though, is no 
justification for a rule presenting religious believers with a stark option—“dress 
                                                                                                                                     
Memorandum, 29 STAN. L. REV. 879, 882 (1979).  It is “the ‘P = I’ variation, a sort of radical 
individualistic intuitionism in which the good becomes what the speaker thinks it is.”  Id.   
122
 To say “‘It is right to do X because I say so’” still requires the reply, “‘Who the hell are 
you[?]’”  Arthur A. Leff, Law and Technology: On Shoring Up a Void, 8 OTTAWA L. REV. 536, 
541 (1976).  Leff rejected this and all other standard methods for grounding normative assertions 
because   
[n]one provide[s] a satisfactory answer to what Leff called “‘the grand sez 
who?’”—a universal taunt by which a skeptic may challenge the 
standing/competency of the speaker to make authoritative moral assessments . . . 
Leff argued, as a matter of logic, that no system of morals premised in mankind 
alone ever could withstand the taunt.  His provocative conclusion was that the 
only unchallengeable response to “‘the grand sez who?’” is ‘God says.’”  
Calhoun, supra note 19, at 32 (footnote omitted).  (It is important to note that Leff’s 
argument about God’s indispensability was in the abstract only.  Leff’s goal was to point 
out the catastrophic impact of God’s non-existence on moral epistemology.  He did not 
examine whether or not God actually exists and, if so, whether He could ground a 
workable moral system.  See id. at 33, 63, 95.)       
123
 Dawkins does suggest that his moral values are shared by “almost all…ordinary, decent” 
people.  See DAWKINS, supra note 22, at 264-65.  Leff would call this a “‘P = everyone’” 
rationale.  Leff, Memorandum, supra note 121, at 882.  Even if the entire world believes that 
something is right, Leff would “ask, ‘[S]o what?’  ‘What is the ethical significance of a factual 
proposition even so universalized?’ . . . The existence of a universally held belief establishes only 
the existence of that belief.  It tells us nothing about what constitutes ‘the right and the good.’”  
Calhoun, supra note 19, at 36 (footnotes omitted).             
124
 This essay does not purport to have fully explored Rawls’s criticism of exclusively religious 
arguments.  Doing so is unnecessary due to the rarity of such arguments in the real world.  For a 
more comprehensive critique of Rawls, see McConnell, supra note 115 passim.          
125
 See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. 
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up” your argument with so-called secular reasons or “shut up.”
126
  These 
alternatives make a mockery of any meaningful concept of freedom of expression.                 
 
(C) IMPOSITION OF FAITH 
A final reason
127
 for generally wanting to exclude religious discourse and 
religiously motivated actions from the public square might be the alarm that many 
people, including Bush’s critics, feel when they perceive someone else is trying to 
impose their religious faith.
128
  Then–Senator Barack Obama stated that, on the 
2004 campaign trail he made the “typically liberal” statement that in a pluralistic 
society he should not impose his religious views on another.
129
  On reflection, 
however, he now thinks that it is wrong “to ask believers to leave their religion at 
the door before entering into the public square.”
130
  He cites Abraham Lincoln and 
                                                 
126
 Since arguments framed exclusively in God-denying terms would be irrelevant to those of 
faith, fairness would require that this same option be presented to those making exclusively non-
religious arguments.   
127
 An additional criticism one sometimes sees is that a faith-based public policy automatically 
violates the Establishment Clause.  Consider the implications of such a stance.  As has been 
shown, the Declaration of Independence’s pronouncement of human equality and unalienable 
rights is faith-based.  See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.  Does the Declaration then 
violate the Constitution?  If so, then so would the actions of Abraham Lincoln against slavery, and 
the actions of Martin Luther King Jr. against racial inequality, for the efforts of both men were 
imbued with religious faith.  See supra notes 69-87 and accompanying text.  Similarly, John F. 
Kennedy’s call for Civil Rights legislation would be constitutionally infirm.  See supra note 78 
and accompanying text. 
   There is another major weakness in any Establishment Clause attack on faith-based 
action in the public sphere.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that no Establishment Clause 
violation occurs from the mere fact that a governmental action implements a policy that coincides 
with a religious belief.  Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 604 n.8, 605-606 (1988) (rejecting a 
facial challenge to the Adolescent Family Life Act); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 
(1980) (upholding abortion funding restrictions); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 
(1961) (upholding a Sunday closing law).  Embryonic life can be defended with secular, i.e., not 
explicitly religious, arguments.  The starting point is the scientifically indisputable fact that human 
life—a living human organism—begins at conception.  See ALEXANDER TSIARAS, FROM 
CONCEPTION TO BIRTH: A LIFE UNFOLDS 5-7, 16, 41-42, 50-51, & 83-111 (2002).  The value of 
this living organism can be defended on secular grounds.  See ROBERT P. GEORGE   & 
CHRISTOPHER TOLLEFSEN, EMBRYO: A DEFENSE OF HUMAN LIFE 19-22 (2008).  President Bush in 
fact included secular arguments in explaining his vetoes.  See supra text accompanying notes 108-
110.            
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 Professor Stephen Carter says that “‘imposing religious beliefs’” is an “awful phrase.”  
CARTER, supra note 88, at 22.  “[I]n contemporary political and legal culture, nothing is worse” 
than the charge that “you are intent on imposing your religious beliefs on other people.”  Id.   
129
 Barack Obama, ‘Call to Renewal’ Keynote Address (June 28, 2006), available at 
http://obama.senate.gov/speech/060628-call_to_renewal/print.php.  
130
 Id.  Former presidential candidate Mitt Romney has also criticized those who would seek to 
eliminate religion from the public square:  
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Martin Luther King Jr. as reformers who “were not only motivated by [their] 




The examples of Lincoln and King reveal a major flaw with the knee-jerk 
pejorative connotation attached to the phrase “imposition of faith.”
132
  Lincoln 
imposed his faith on those who wanted to preserve the institution of slavery.
133
  
King and other “leaders of the civil rights movement… made no effort to disguise 
their true intention: to impose their religious morality on others, on the dissenters 
who would rather segregate their hotels or lunch counters….”
134
   
 
But did Lincoln and King impose their faith in a negative sense?  Each viewed his 
actions as simply doing what was right.  Lincoln believed slavery to be wrong, 
and King believed racial inequality to be wrong, but for each man belief alone 
was not sufficient.  If something is wrong, one should treat it as a wrong.
135
  As a 
                                                                                                                                     
[I]n recent years, the notion of the separation of church and state has been taken by 
some well beyond its original meaning.  They seek to remove from the public 
domain any acknowledgment of God.  Religion is seen as merely a private affair 
with no place in public life.  It is as if they are intent on establishing a new religion 
in America - the religion of secularism.  They are wrong. 
Mitt Romney, Faith in America, Speech at the George Bush Presidential Library (Dec.  6, 
2007), available at http://www.mittromney.com/Faith-In-America.    
131
 Obama, supra note 129.  At the April 2008 Compassion Forum at Messiah College, Senator 
Obama once again cited King and Lincoln in arguing that people of faith have the right to express 
religious values in religious terms in the public square: "[I]magine Dr. King . . . in front of the 
Lincoln Memorial and having to scrub all his religious references, or Abraham Lincoln in the 
Second Inaugural not being able to refer to God."  Interview by Campbell Brown and Jon 




 See supra note 128. 
133
 See supra note 77; infra note 136.   
134
 CARTER, supra note 88, at 229.  Peter Levy writes “that the modern civil rights movement . . . 
sought to turn the ideals of the Declaration of Independence and Christian morality into a reality 
for all of America’s citizens.”  LET FREEDOM RING, supra note 78, at 1-2.  
135
 To King, recognizing that segregation was a “disease” was not enough.  See King, Letter, supra 
note 79, at 83.  To those who called “‘Wait!’” in an effort to delay his “direct-action campaign,” 
King responded that freedom would never be attained unless “demanded by the oppressed.”  Id. at 
82-83.  Lincoln, in his famous speech at the Cooper Institute, also stressed the need for action.  
Since he believed that slavery was wrong, he could not refrain from trying to stop its spread to the 
territories.  See Abraham Lincoln, Address at Cooper Institute (Feb. 27, 1860), in 3 COLLECTED 
WORKS, supra note 65, at 522, 550.  He urged his audience not to let fear keep them from acting: 
“LET US HAVE FAITH THAT RIGHT MAKES MIGHT, AND IN THAT FAITH, LET US, TO 
THE END, DARE TO DO OUR DUTY AS WE UNDERSTAND IT.”  Id.          
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nation, we praise both Lincoln and King for acting as they did.  Should our praise 
diminish because their concepts of right and wrong were premised in their 
religious faith?
136
  Similarly, President Bush believes, on religious grounds, that 
intentionally destroying human embryos is morally wrong, no matter how worthy 
the motivation.  He therefore acted consistently with that belief via his vetoes.  
Why then should President Bush, with respect to the appropriateness of invoking 
his religious faith, be viewed any differently from Lincoln or King?   
 
III. IS A VETO A SPECIAL CASE? 
Mario Cuomo, in an editorial written prior to the President’s vetoes, suggests a 
possible basis for targeting faith-based vetoes for criticism.  According to Cuomo, 
“our pluralistic political system adopts rights that arise out of consensus, not the 
dictates of religious orthodoxy.”
137
  Thus, if a law “financing stem cell research 
on leftover embryos” were ever passed, it would be wrong for the President to 
veto it “as an expression of his religious faith.”
138
  The suggestion is that a veto is 
anti-democratic.  Another Bush critic states this point more emphatically—the 





This “veto as fiat” critique of Bush fails.  Cuomo’s consensus-driven vision of 
politics is inaccurate, whether by “consensus” he means total or general 
                                                 
136
 In the Second Inaugural, Lincoln expressed a resolve to act “with firmness in the right, as God 
gives us to see the right.”  Lincoln, Second Inaugural, supra note 74, at 333.  Part of that “right” 
was “to finish the work we are in,” i.e., the military defeat of what he called “the insurgents.”  See 
id. at 332-333.  This is the ultimate form of using public force to impose a religious viewpoint.  
See DAVID S. REYNOLDS, JOHN BROWN, ABOLITIONIST x (2005) (“[I]s there any question that 
Lincoln and his generals did not, in effect, end up following Brown’s lead by condoning God-
ordained violence?”)  But cf. WILLS, supra note 77, at 189 (arguing, erroneously in my view, that 
“the work” to which Lincoln referred was “‘the unfinished work’” of implementing the 
proposition of human equality emphasized in the Gettysburg Address).              
137
 Mario M. Cuomo, Op-Ed., Not on Faith Alone, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2005, at A15.  Cuomo 
also emphasized governing by consensus in his celebrated 1984 speech at Notre Dame: “Our 
public morality . . . the moral standards we maintain for everyone, not just the ones we insist on in 
our private lives, depends on a consensus view of right and wrong.”  Mario M. Cuomo, Religious 
Belief And Public Morality: A Catholic Governor’s Perspective, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 13, 18 (1984); see also MARIO M. CUOMO, WHY LINCOLN MATTERS: TODAY MORE 
THAN EVER 136 (2004).   
138
 Cuomo, Op-Ed., supra note 137.   
139
 Editorial, supra note 15. 
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agreement.  Frequently, by very close votes, one group’s conception of right and 
wrong is imposed on the losing side.  Yet Cuomo writes as if imposition never 
exists because nothing is ever done until everyone (or almost everyone) agrees. 
 
In fact, Cuomo causes needless confusion by his misuse of the word “consensus.”  
Elsewhere, he makes clear that in principle it is unobjectionable for religious 
believers to attempt to win majority support (i.e., consensus is not mandated) for 
their faith-based morality:  
 
[T]he same amendment of the Constitution that forbids the 
establishment of a state church affirms my legal right to argue that 
my religious belief would serve well as an article of our universal 
public morality.  I may use the prescribed processes of 
government  
. . . to convince my fellow citizens, Jews and Protestants and 
Buddhists and non-believers, that what I propose is as beneficial 




Under this interpretation, President Bush could appropriately make religious 
arguments in attempting to win a majority for his opposition to embryonic stem 
cell research, but he was wrong to act decisively on the matter, via his veto, 
absent majority support.  This is simply another way of stating the “veto as fiat” 
argument.        
 
Strictly speaking, a presidential veto is not anti-democratic.  Although a veto, 
unless overridden, operates by definition to frustrate the majority will as reflected 
in the legislation passed by Congress, the veto power exists only because the 
                                                 
140
 Cuomo, Religious Belief And Public Morality, supra note 137, at 16-17.  Cuomo’s 2005 Op-Ed 
reiterates “the right of believers to advocate for changes in our civil law that correspond with their 
own view of morality.”  Cuomo, Op-Ed., supra note 137.  Cuomo is perfectly willing to accept 
any impositions of faith that occur when a losing minority is compelled to acquiesce in the 
majority will.  “Every day Americans who abhor the death penalty, contraceptives, abortions and 
war are required to pay taxes used in part for purposes they consider offensive.  That is part of the 
price we pay for this uniquely successful democracy.”  Id.      
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Constitution, adopted by the people, creates it.
141
  Equally important, Bush was 
elected as President.  His supporters chose him as the person they wanted to 
exercise all of the powers of the chief executive, including the veto power.        
 
Moreover, Bush did nothing new in relying upon God in a veto message.
142
  
President Andrew Jackson twice referred to God in his famous veto of a bill to 
recharter the Bank of the United States.
143
  One instance might be dismissed as 
non-substantive: Jackson, in the final paragraph, calls the country to “firmly rely 
on that kind Providence which I am sure watches with peculiar care over the 
destinies of our Republic.”
144
  Elsewhere, however, Jackson emphasizes the bill’s 
failure to accord equal justice to the rich and poor,
145
 contrary to the principle that 
Heaven follows with rain, “shower[ing] its favors alike on the high and the 
low.”
146
     
 
Exercise of the veto power is not the only situation in which Presidents have 
relied upon religion to take decisive action without awaiting majority approval.
147
  
                                                 
141
 Justice White’s statement concerning Supreme Court jurisprudence is even more applicable to 
the veto power: “Because the Constitution itself is ordained and established by the people of the 
United States, constitutional adjudication by this Court does not, in theory at any rate, frustrate the 
authority of the people to govern themselves through institutions of their own devising and in 
accordance with principles of their own choosing.”  Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obst. & Gyn., 
476 U.S. 747, 787 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).  If the Court’s “constitutional adjudication,” 
nowhere expressly authorized by the Constitution, does not violate democratic principles, then a 
President’s veto, pursuant to a power expressly granted, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, obviously 
does not do so.         
142
 That Bush likely would rely upon God in making public policy decisions should come as no 
surprise to those who voted for him.  Many presumably supported Bush because they wanted a 
President who would make faith-influenced decisions.  Some no doubt supported him for different 
reasons, but no one could reasonably claim unawareness of Bush’s faith or its importance to him.         
143
 See Veto Message—Bank of the United States (July 10, 1832), in THE STATESMANSHIP OF 
ANDREW JACKSON 154-76 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909). 
144
 Id. at 176. 
145
 Id. at 158, 175.   
146
 Id. at 175 (a clear allusion to Matthew 5:45).  Jackson also made a number of admittedly 
secular objections to the rechartering.  See Veto Message, supra note 143.  
147
 Another example is President Ford’s pardon of Richard Nixon.  Ford thought that the pardon 
was best for the country, but he also believed that “as a humble servant of God, [he would] receive 
justice without mercy if [he failed] to show mercy.”  Gerald R. Ford, Pardon of Richard Nixon 
(Sept. 8, 1974), in BALMER, supra note 78, at 189-93.  See BALMER, supra note 78, at 159, 161.  
As Ford noted in his address, a President has express constitutional authority to issue pardons.  
Ford, supra (citing U.S. CONST. art. II , § 2, cl. 1).  Still, a pardon is contramajoritarian in the 
sense criticized by Cuomo.  Ford’s pardon of Nixon was in fact contramajoritarian, as public 
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In September 1965, President Lyndon Johnson issued Executive Order 11246, 
which is credited with giving the first real teeth to the notion of affirmative action 
as a remedy for past discrimination.
148
  The explanation for Johnson’s bold move 
can be found in the commencement address, “To Fulfill These Rights,” which 
Johnson delivered the preceding June at Howard University.
149
  Johnson spoke 
eloquently of what fairness demands: “You do not take a man who, for years, has 
been hobbled by chains, liberate him, bring him to the starting line of a race, 
saying ‘you are free to compete with all the others,’ and still justly believe that 
you have been completely fair.”
150
  But what characteristics of Negroes (as 
Johnson referred to African-Americans) make us care whether they are treated 




 but also “children of God” to 
whom “wrong” had been done by the ancient “enmities of the heart” caused by 
racism.
153
  Johnson ended his address by quoting what “[t]he Scripture 
promises.”
154
            
 
In criticizing Bush, Cuomo applied the “fiat” critique in a highly selective 
manner.  Whatever Cuomo may think of President Johnson’s contramajoritarian 
act,
155
 he clearly approves of Martin Luther King’s use of massive civil 
                                                                                                                                     
disapproval “was a major factor, perhaps the decisive factor, in [his] failure to win election in his 
own right in 1976.”  See BALMER, supra note 78, at 190.     
148
 See PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE & ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE 
DIRECT ACTION 55-57 (2002); KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE 
ORDERS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 203 (2001).     
149
 See COOPER, supra note 148, at 56. 
150
Lyndon B. Johnson, President, Howard University Commencement Address (June 4, 1965) , in 
CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 106, at 559, 560.  Randall Balmer writes that Johnson “gleaned from his 
parents at least the rudiments of a kind of ‘golden rule’ Christianity.”  BALMER, supra note 78, at 
52.  His mother taught him that the strong should care for the weak, and this principle “informed 
Johnson’s domestic initiatives . . . his concern for those less advantaged was most apparent in his 
push for civil rights.”  Id. at 52-53. 
151
 Howard University Commencement Address, supra note 150, at 560.   
152
 Id. at 561.  
153
 Id. at 565. 
154
 Id. at 566.  Johnson quoted from the Apocrypha, 2 Esdras 14:25.   
155
 As with a veto, see note 141 and accompanying text, an executive order, strictly speaking, is 
not anti-democratic, assuming the President has the legal authority to issue the particular order in 
question.  See MAYER, supra note 148, at 18-19.  Still, an executive order, like a veto, is 
contramajoritarian according to Cuomo’s meaning of that term.  Johnson’s executive order 
implementing affirmative action committed the federal government to a public policy that 
continues to be highly controversial.         
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disobedience to achieve racial equality.
156
  While this tactic may have the ultimate 
goal of changing the law,
157
 in the pre-reform period, however long,
158
 its impact, 
undeniably, was to thwart majority will.
159
  Yet King did not postpone acting 
decisively on his faith-based views until he could convince the majority.
160
   
 
Cuomo himself has a history of acting decisively to implement his beliefs.  As 
Governor of New York, he repeatedly vetoed legislative attempts to reinstate the 
death penalty.
161
  How, then, can he criticize Bush?  Presumably, by attempting to 
distinguish his vigorous opposition to the death penalty, maintained in the face of 
majority opposition, from Bush’s vetoes.  To Cuomo, because science cannot 
                                                 
156
 As Governor of New York, Cuomo “signed legislation . . . establishing a state institute that will 
encourage the study [of King’s] methods and philosophy in New York schools and colleges.”  
Cuomo Signs Bill on Dr. King,  N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1988, at B2.      
157
 King described his overall objective as: 
bring[ing] to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive.  We bring it 
out in the open, where it can be seen and dealt with.  Like a boil that can 
never be cured so long as it is covered up but must be opened with all its 
ugliness to the natural medicines of air and light, injustice must be exposed, 
with all the tension its exposure creates, to the light of human conscience and 
the air of national opinion before it can be cured. 
Letter, supra note 79, at 85.  In the short term, the goal in Birmingham was “to create a 
situation so crisis-packed that it [would] inevitably open the door to negotiation.”  Id. at 
80.  
158
 What if King had never been successful in accomplishing legal reform?  One cannot imagine 
that this failure would have altered Cuomo’s (or anyone else’s) admiration for King.  If this 
supposition is correct, it demonstrates that Cuomo does not in fact view deference to majority will 
as a general bar to religiously motivated acts designed to frustrate the majority.       
159
 Cuomo presumably would see no hypocrisy in his applauding King but criticizing Bush for 
their respective contramajoritarian activities.  But what is the distinction between the two cases?  
Is it only that Cuomo believes that racial inequality is so immoral that even anti-democratic 
measures against it are warranted, but he does not believe this about the destruction of embryos?  
Why, though, should Cuomo’s view of morality—and consequent latitude with respect to 
overriding majority will—be accorded more significance than Bush’s?  For the rejection of 
Cuomo’s asserted distinction based on what science can prove about the born and preborn, see 
infra notes 161-165 and accompanying text.                
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 Other evidence is King’s efforts to convince President Kennedy to issue executive orders 
against segregation.  King exhorted the newly elected President to “‘give segregation its death 
blow through a stroke of the pen.’”  MAYER, supra note 148, at 8 (quoting Martin Luther King Jr., 
Equality Now: The President Has the Power, THE NATION, Feb. 4, 1961, at 91, 93).  After 
Birmingham, King, “[i]n both his public and private comments . . . [emphasized] the pressing need 
for unilateral executive action on civil rights.”  DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN 
LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 267 (1986); see 
BRANCH, supra note 79, at 816.       
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 See Mario M. Cuomo, Speech at the College of St. Rose (Mar. 20, 1989), in CONGREGATION OF 
THE CONDEMNED 259, 260 (Shirley Dicks ed., 1991); Father Matthew Regan “Catholics and the 
Death Penalty,” in FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: VOLUME 1: THE DEATH PENALTY 112, 114 (Claudia 
Whitman & Julie Zimmerman eds., 1997).       
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prove “‘when a fertilized egg becomes sacred,’”
162
 Bush must have acted on 
religious faith alone.
163
  Opposition to the death penalty is different because it 





Cuomo fails to grasp the key distinction between scientific fact and moral 
judgment.  That a particular human organism is “mature” or “adult” is a scientific 
fact,
165
 but science tells us nothing about how much, if any, value it should be 
accorded.  Adult human beings have been ruthlessly devalued, individually and 
according to assorted classifications, throughout human history.  That Cuomo 
accords greater value to adult humans than to embryonic humans results from a 
moral value judgment not different in kind from the judgment President Bush 
makes about embryonic humans.  Why should Cuomo’s perception of morality—
including his willingness, contrary to majority will, to protect the life of the 
former but not the latter—be entitled to more deference than Bush’s?                                       
 
CONCLUSION  
President Bush did nothing inappropriate in stating his religious premises to 
explain his vetoes of embryonic stem cell research legislation.  Faith-based values 
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 Cuomo, Op-Ed., supra note 137.  By “‘sacred,’” Cuomo appears to mean an entity that can 
rightly be called a human being with a right to life.  See id.  As argued in the text, see infra text 
accompanying note 165, science alone can never determine when a human organism achieves this 
key benchmark, regardless of stage of development.       
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 See Cuomo, Op-Ed., supra note 137. 
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 Mario M. Cuomo, Persuade or Coerce?  A Response to Kenneth Woodward, COMMONWEAL, 
Sept. 24, 2004, at 13, 15.  Presumably, this alleged distinction also explains Cuomo’s approval of 
former Illinois Governor George Ryan’s contramajoritarian anti-death penalty measures.  In 2000, 
Ryan placed a moratorium on executions in Illinois, Dirk Johnson, Illinois, Citing Faulty Verdicts, 
Bars Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2000, at A1, followed in 2003 by a blanket commutation of 
all death penalty sentences.  Jodi Wilgoren, Citing Issues of Fairness, Governor Cleans Out Death 
Row in Illinois, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, § 1, at 11.  For these acts, Ryan received two awards 
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(Mario Cuomo serves on its Advisory Board): the 2001 Mario Cuomo Act of Courage Award and 
the 2003 Rose Elizabeth Bird Commitment to Justice Award.  See  
http://www.deathpenalty.org/index.php?pid=dinner.  Ryan’s speech defending his commutation 
only indirectly relied upon religion, but it was suffused with moral arguments.  See George H. 
Ryan, Address at Northwestern University College of Law (Jan. 11, 2003), available at 
http://www.stopcapitalpunishment.org/ryans_speech.html.  Ryan acted decisively “to do the right 
thing,” id., contrary to imposed death sentences, without waiting until he won majority support.     
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 “Maturity” is a scientific fact only in reference to physical development. 
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have played a significant role throughout American history.  Bush acted in accord 
with this long-established national tradition.    
 
Bush also did nothing normatively inappropriate.  Attempts to delegitimatize 
religious points-of-view cannot be justified by charges of irrationality or 
imposition-of-faith fears.  Both are bogus critiques of religious discourse and 
action in the public square.  Disagreement about important subjects often involves 
the clash of foundational presuppositions.  Many who seek to muzzle religious 
believers and preclude faith-based action are attempting to privilege their own 
atheistic or agnostic metaphysical presuppositions before the contest begins.
166
  
This then enables them more easily to impose their own values upon society.  All 
law is the imposition of someone’s values.
167
  So-called secular values are not 
entitled to a priori preference. 
 
Anyone seeking to squelch religiously motivated argument and action exposes 
himself or herself as someone lacking a true commitment to diversity.  Consider 
the illogical conclusion to Frank Rich’s New York Times editorial lambasting 
President Bush’s stem cell vetoes.  Rich endorses the criticism of Senator Joe 
Lieberman by the Anti-Defamation League, which deemed his “incessant Bible 
thumping (while running for vice president in 2000) . . . ‘inappropriate and even 
unsettling in a religiously diverse society such as ours.’”
168
  Astoundingly, and 
ironically, Rich and the League appear quite content to exclude Bible-thumpers as 
legitimate participants in political debate in our “‘religiously diverse society.’”  
To them, diversity obviously has its limits.    
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 This would not be true of those Rawlsians who say that ultimate truth claims are contestable 
and religious believers are permissible disputants.  See supra text accompanying notes 111-114.  
Rawlsians, however, maintain that religious truth claims must be bolstered by secular arguments.  
See id.  This essay, while acknowledging that it may be prudent for believers to do so, rejects any 
such requirement.  See supra text accompanying notes 124-126.  
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 As President-Elect Obama has stated: “[T]o say that men and women should not inject their 
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codification of morality . . . .”  Obama, ‘Call to Renewal,’ supra note 129.                            
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 Rich, supra note 11. 
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A diverse discourse is valuable precisely because it contains points of view and 
leads to action that some participants will disagree with or even abhor.
169
  The 
clash of competing ideas will sometimes, perhaps often, create discomfort, but 
this is an inevitable cost of a genuine allegiance to democratic ideals.
170
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 Any branding of faith-based arguments as illegitimate in the public square is the principal 
target of this essay.  As previously stated, supra note 21 and accompanying text, one should 
expect that faith-based arguments often will not persuade even those of the same faith, much less 
those of a different faith or no faith at all.  This essay therefore asserts no objection to anyone’s 
disagreeing with a faith-based argument.  The line between perfectly appropriate critique and an 
inappropriate assertion that faith-based arguments have no rightful place in civic discourse may 
not always be easy to discern.        
170
 See supra text accompanying note 126. 
